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“Penetrating the Secret of the Real:”  Perceptions of the Humanities 
and the Sciences in the Weltanschauung Discourse at the Fin de Siècle 
 
In an introduction to a 1911 anthology entitled Weltanschauung.  Philosophy and 
Religion, the author bemoans the loss of a unified world view through the continuous 
subdivision of disciplines.  The natural sciences in particular are to blame, the author 
submits.  The nineteenth century saw the rise of the positive sciences and delved into 
experience as its basis, rejecting metaphysics, especially from the earlier part of the 
century.  Now, at the Turn of the Century, there has been a movement to regain the lost 
unified view striven for earlier, even utilizing the natural sciences as one basis as well.  
The above quotation, “penetrating the secret of the real”, is the conclusion demanded by 
the author, which insinuates a melding of the natural scientific and humanistic 
perspective, the utilization of humanity’s tools to illuminate in a comprehensive and 
unified fashion natural scientific discoveries.1  This anthology is one manifestation of the 
Weltanschauung discourse at the Turn of the Century, but simultaneously is a reflection 
of the anxiety and apprehension felt by many at this pivotal point in time. 
 
Indeed, the time period around the year 1900, particularly beginning in the 1890s, was 
marked by a pervasive cultural pessimism brought on by accelerated industrialization, 
and by the swift advance in new scientific discoveries and their accompanying 
technological innovations.  This phenomenon has been characterized variously as the 
 2 
crisis or shock of modernization and it signaled to many a loss of cherished, established 
cultural values and norms.  Intellectuals, along with significant segments of the middle 
class, were especially hard hit by these developments. 
 
The origins of this phenomenon can be seen at mid-century, when science and all of its 
anticipated potential began to exert a strong influence on society and instilled in it the 
expectation that it, that is science, would find all the answers, resulting in a unified world 
view. 
 
 
“It was the promise of a wholly unified, scientific account of all existence that 
underlay some of the most aggressively confident ‘materialist’ pronouncements of 
the 1850s and 1860s, scandalizing to some, exhilarating to others.  To the latter the 
key to the universe seemed only just out of reach and the route to it, physical 
science and particularly experiment, already laid out.”2 
 
 
As the century advanced, however, this belief or great hope would prove to be a chimera, 
since in many respects exactly the opposite occurred:  With the increase in knowledge 
achieved by means of the experimental method and the ever-increasing number of 
specialties and sub-specialties within the natural sciences, the much hoped for realization 
of a unified scientific world view grew ever more distant.  This apparent “antithesis” of 
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progress, which paradoxically accompanied the scientific and technological advances, 
fueled even more uncertainty and added to a sense of crisis and disillusionment.   
 
The search for new meaning and a synthesis of conflicting views becomes the hallmark 
of the Weltanschauung discourse that flourished at the Turn of the Century.  Implicit in 
this discourse is a grappling with the relationship between the humanities and the natural 
sciences and their points of intersection.  First we need to define what is meant by 
Weltanschauung literature.  One leading scholar, Horst Thomé, has defined this new text 
category as “a body of texts that explicitly claims to represent the ‘world view’ of the 
author in an argumentative fashion.  In most instances broad analyses of scientific results 
are coupled with daring hypotheses, metaphysical theory fragments, autobiographical 
information, personal statements of belief, and instructions for ethical behavior, 
contemporary political diagnoses and societal organizational models.”3  This category 
thus represents a melding of the scientific and the personal/subjective, amassing a variety 
of information from a range of sources.  What however provides the impetus for these 
works is their pre-occupation with the new scientifically-oriented world.  The 
Weltanschauung texts typically contain one central/unifying idea or thought (leitende 
Idee) that then hierarchically subsumes a number of areas of knowledge around it (341).  
This format, albeit not one consciously followed by its practitioners, allows an author to 
expound upon a range of topics. 
 
The three authors I have chosen were major contributors to the Weltanschauung 
discourse at the Turn of the Century.  They represent three different standpoints or at 
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least variations of the fin-de-siècle debate on the role of the natural sciences and the 
humanities, as well as their relations to one another.  Each arrives at a different 
conclusion with respect to the natural science/humanities divide around 1900. 
Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919) was a well-established and highly respected biologist, 
initially a professor of anatomy within the medical faculty in Jena before being named 
Professor of Zoology and joining the philosophy faculty.  He was at the same time an 
ardent Darwin popularizer, as well as a dedicated monist.  Monism is any belief system 
that denies any duality or plurality within reality.  The early twentieth-century version of 
monism, espoused by Haeckel and his supporters, is a form of materialistic monism, 
since it recognizes matter as the sole reality.  At the same time, it attempts to transcend 
this materialist viewpoint by seeking to unite matter and mind into another, unspecified, 
yet higher something.  Its lack of specificity is a major drawback to this view.  Haeckel’s 
main work, Die Welträthsel (The Riddle of the Universe) is a clear example of the turn-
of-the-century Weltanschauung literature.4  It is divided into four sections:  an 
anthropological, a psychological, a cosmological and a theological.  In the first part, the 
anthropological section, Haeckel critiques the absence of any meaningful science 
curriculum in the schools, but also makes the following pronouncement with respect to 
the humanities:  “The natural sciences, which are so much more important than all other 
sciences, and which, properly understood, really embrace all the so-called humanities, are 
still regarded as a mere accessory in our schools, if not treated as the Cinderella of the 
curriculum” (10).  It is clear that as a natural scientist, Haeckel shares many of his 
contemporaries’ predilections to view the natural science perspective as the predominant 
paradigm, subsuming all viewpoints, including the humanities, under its umbrella.  At the 
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same time, however, Haeckel does not entirely dismiss all other non-scientific views.  In 
the psychological section of his work, he cites metaphysical speculation as one distinct 
and useful point of view.  In addition, he does include aesthetics as part of his monistic 
vision, connecting art and science through his own work and revealing a deep 
appreciation of the aesthetic element in nature.  Notwithstanding these digressions, 
however, Haeckel still ultimately regards the natural sciences as predominant, surpassing 
the humanities in all respects.  
 
Wilhelm Bölsche (1861-1939), a writer both of literary works and popular “Sachbücher”, 
that is, works on specialized subjects for a general audience, is a well-known monist as 
Haeckel und popularizer of evolutionary theory.  Bölsche can be viewed as more of a 
mediatory figure.  Though clearly a monist, his use of poeticized language as a scientific 
popularizer and his early commitment to aesthetics, albeit a natural scientific one, point 
to this mediatory role.  His literary credentials include a prominent role in the 
Friedrichshagener Dichterkreis (Friedrichshagen poet’s circle), a loosely formed group 
that propagated German Naturalism.  Bölsche’s ideas on the role of the natural sciences 
in the new literature of Naturalism are laid out in his 1887 work Die 
naturwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen der Poesie (The Natural Scientific Bases of 
Poetry).5 In the foreword to this book, he lays out his expectations for the new generation 
of poets/writers:  “…what I demand and hope from the rising generation of poets is an 
adept implementation of better knowledge in the area of psychology, of better 
observations, and of more healthy perceptions; the basis for this is contact with the 
natural sciences” (1). Bölsche’s work, though a clear manifesto of German Naturalism, is 
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hardly a call to arms or a work filled with inflammatory rhetoric.  Instead, from the 
perspective of the natural science/humanities divide, it strikes a more conciliatory tone.  
Indeed, its first chapter is entitled “The Conciliatory Tendency of Realism” (Realism was 
the initial designation of the movement, later christened Naturalism.).  Bölsche does 
negate the purely metaphysical standpoint, as he describes it, favoring a realistic aesthetic 
based upon “impartial research” (1), yet his goal is to raise art along with the natural 
sciences and not get bogged down in a perpetual struggle between both sides (11).  He 
envisions more of a melding of poetic practice and scientific experiment (7).  This new 
poetic creation, as he sees it, should not go beyond the natural and possible and allow 
everything to develop logically but done within the framework of poetic fantasy.  Thus, 
this newly defined ‘poetic experiment’ benefits from its use of the natural scientific 
perspective.  Bölsche ends his treatise on this new aesthetic as follows:  “Poetry thus 
preserves its long standing role as educator of humanity.  In so doing, it may hope to 
encounter the natural sciences on friendly ground.  Both shall extend their hands to one 
another in an effort to make humanity healthy” (65).  Turning briefly to Bölsche’s second 
work under consideration here, Das Liebesleben in der Natur.  Eine 
Entwickelungsgeschichte der Liebe (Love-life in Nature.  The Story of the Evolution of 
Love, 1898),6 was, similar to Haeckel’s work, a great success at the Turn of the Century.  
Bölsche is credited with being the originator of the so-called Sachbuch, as previously 
mentioned, a work on a specialized subject for the general public.  He typically wrote on 
natural scientific topics and this is considered his first major Sachbuch.  This book also 
clearly belongs in the category of Weltanschauung literature, which he himself explicitly 
alludes to in the foreword.  At the same time, though the book treats a natural scientific 
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topic, he views the external form of the work as “essentially an aesthetic one” (VIII).  
The bridge between the rigorous scientific area to the consciousness or individual seeking 
out general principles or themes is by way of art, according to Bölsche.  And it is by this 
means, utilizing aesthetics in order to illuminate science’s achievements, that he in his 
own way unites the sciences with the humanities.  Indeed, his work, this proto-Sachbuch, 
does not read like some dull scientific tract.  In its place, he uses a fictionalized one-on-
one personal conversation as the basis for his sweeping review of the evolution of love in 
nature, starting with the cellular level, advancing through a series of animals, both simple 
and complex, culminating of course with the human species.  As is illustrated by both 
these works, Bölsche is mindful of the dichotomous nature of the relations between the 
natural sciences and the humanities, but attempts to quell the conflict through his own 
form of mediation, attempting to unite the aesthetic with the natural scientific.   
 
The work of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), the noted philosopher, can be viewed as an 
attempt to place the humanities on an equal footing with the natural sciences at a time 
when they clearly have the upper hand.  Indeed, in many respects Dilthey places the 
humanities, or perhaps more fitting the human sciences or studies, above the natural 
sciences, as he sees a greater need in society for their findings.  Dilthey’s Einleitung in 
die Geisteswissenschaften (Introduction to the Humanities/Human Sciences),7 first 
published in 1883, delves into the distinct characteristics of the humanities, in search of a 
fitting methodology for the humanities, and draws clear distinctions to the natural 
sciences.  Dilthey makes the following classifications with respect to the natural 
science/humanities divide:  The natural sciences deal with the outer world, as perceived 
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through our senses (sensation), whereas the humanities concern themselves with the inner 
world by means of the inner perception of psychic events and activities (8).  His most 
well-known distinction is however the difference between the two German verbs erklären 
and verstehen.  The natural sciences have nature as their object of study and their intent is 
to explain (erklären) nature.  Nature is examined and observed and assumptions are made 
with respect to the causes of natural events and processes.  Natural processes are viewed 
as specific examples of general laws of nature.  The products of the human mind and 
intellect are the object of investigation for the humanities.  In contrast to the natural 
sciences, these can be understood (verstehen), as they are created by humans.  The 
natural sciences cannot understand nature, simply explain it.  However, natural scientific 
explanations are verifiable, whereas those of the humanities are not.  Dilthey admits that 
it is unclear whether anything can be completely understood.  Yet experience, in 
particular inner experience, is at a higher level than anything the natural sciences can 
offer.  For Dilthey nature is, as one scholar expresses it “merely appearance, an outer 
shell and the attire of that which cannot be experienced”.8 
 
To further add to this perspective, especially as it relates to the concept of 
Weltanschauung and the notion of experience, I turn to Dilthey’s later essay “The Types 
of Weltanschauung and their Formation in Metaphysical Systems”.9  Though not directly 
concerned with the natural science/humanities discourse, it does shed some light on his 
views.  Dilthey’s introduction speaks of the divergence of views and multiplicity of 
viewpoints brought on by the historization of the world;  it is an anarchy of perspectives 
and stands in stark contrast to philosophy that strives for universal validity (although here 
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too there have been conflicts and divergences among the many philosophical systems).  
Still, he sees the main culprit as historical consciousness that has created a relativist point 
of view.  Life he sees as the unifying principle that will help abolish the contradiction 
between the demand of philosophy for universal validity and historical anarchy.  Life is 
regarded as the ultimate root of Weltanschauung.  And it is Lebenserfahrung, life 
experience, that emerges from reflecting on life (8).  From this same introduction, there is 
a telling statement that differentiates between what the scientific can accomplish, noting 
its limitations, and what it cannot with respect to the formation of knowledge:  
“The kind of certainty and the character of its formulation are always completely 
dissimilar with respect to scientific universality.  Scientific thinking can check again the 
procedure, upon which its certainty rests, and it can precisely formulate and substantiate 
its theorems.  The formation of our knowledge of life cannot be re-checked in this way 
and definite formulas cannot be articulated” (8-9). 
 
Although it would appear that the non-scientific perspective lacks definitiveness and 
concreteness and therefore its results questionable, yet it is the non-scientific perspective 
alone that can delve into life and life experiences, the central focus of Weltanschauung. 
This perspective makes clear once again that Dilthey sees the humanities as more 
worthwhile in gaining knowledge about life and the world. 
 
To conclude, each of these individuals brings their own nuanced perspective to the 
natural science/humanities discourse at the Turn of the Century.  They represent the range 
of possible responses, from those such as Haeckel, who wish to usurp all authority for the 
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natural sciences, to Bölsche, who is truly seeking a middle ground, leading ultimately to 
Dilthey, who really views the humanities as holding far more promise with respect to its 
potential than the natural sciences.  It is no surprise that such a subtext is present within 
the Weltanschauung debate at the Turn of the Century, as it forms a central focus of 
concern for many at the time.  
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